Thread: Archive Latest News - Think Tank - 01/01/08 - 14/04/08

Kirkuk debate continues over vote

Iraq's Parliament and the oil-rich Kirkuk provincial council are divided on a constitutional referendum to decide the province's fate.

It's a disputed territory following the wrath of Saddam Hussein, and the future of it and other disputed territories was to be decided in a referendum by Dec. 31, 2007.

An 11th-hour deal brokered by the United Nations allowed for a six-month extension to the deadline.

On Thursday, Iraqi parliamentarians disputed what the next step should be, the Voices of Iraq news agency reports, with some considering the constitutional provision void after missing the original deadline.

They'll take up the issue again Jan. 7.

The provincial council, however, demanded in a special session a referendum be held by the end of May 2007, IraqSlogger.com reports.

Kirkuk holds between 11 billion and 15 billion barrels of Iraq's proven oil reserves of 115 billion barrels. The Iraqi Kurdistan region wants the historically Kurdish province to be incorporated into its area. Many Arabs and Turkomen are against it, wanting to keep it under Baghdad's watch.

Saddam Hussein, seeking to keep tabs on the oil and disrupt any Kurdish unity, kicked out Kurds and others, replaced them with Arabs, and redrew the boundaries of northern provinces.

International Security - Energy - Briefing - UPI.com

The internal struggle for the Iraqi oil law continues

A year has passed since the landmark deadline of December 2006, which was ‘publicly’ imposed by the IMF, the Iraqi Study Group (ISG), the US administration and the International Oil companies (IOCs) on the Iraqi government to deliver the long awaited Iraqi oil law.

But it still seems that we are no closer today to seeing the new law approved than we were back in December 2006.

In an August 22, 2007 “What is holding up the delivery of the long-awaited Iraqi oil law,” I covered the history, the background and the political developments surrounding the controversy over the Oil Law, including all the external and internal factors behind the delays in its materialization.

I concluded that internal Iraqi factors were the main causes behind the hold-up of the new oil law.

The developments on the ground over the past four months proved the accuracy of this analysis. Therefore, this article should be read in conjunction with the earlier analysis and should be seen as a further step in bringing the debate surrounding the oil law up-to-date.

The Iraqi dynamics behind all the delays in the approval of the oil law have become more and more obvious over the previous few months. Their role in setting back the delivery of the oil law is becoming accepted by many International and by most Iraqi oil experts and analysts as the key factors bringing the progress on the oil law to a halt, as well as bringing some changes to US tactics on this benchmark.

In this analysis, I will cover the various internal Iraqi factors in more detail, as they have developed over the past few months.

1. The split between the Central Government/Oil Ministry in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

The split on several issues involving the oil law has increased dramatically in the past four months between the above parties and has become public on a number of occasions.

This divide has widened due to the following factors:

First, there was the passing of the “Kurdish Oil law” by the KRG on August 6, 2007, which is mainly founded on Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) model agreements with the IOCs to develop oil production in the Kurdish region, without obtaining the approval of the federal government or awaiting the outcome of the federal oil law.

Second was the rush by the KRG to sign five PSC agreements with smaller IOCs, including DNO from Norway and others from Canada and Turkey, before the enactment of the Kurdish oil Law. These actions were followed by the signing of another fifteen PSC agreements since the passing of the law, without the consultation of the federal oil ministry in Baghdad, as well as having no provisions within the agreements for sharing revenues with the central government.

Third was the inclusion of areas which are located outside the recognized Kurdish region, such as some of the oil fields of the governorate of Ninewa. in the September 2007 PSC agreement with the US company, Hunt Oil (see Iraqi oil expert Faleh Al-Khayat, "KRG Assigns Khurmala Dome in the Kirkuk Field Unilaterally," Amman, Jordan, November 8, 2007.).

Fourth was the decision by the KRG to give one of its newly founded oil companies the responsibility of developing Khurmala, which is one of the three domes of the giant oil producing Kirkuk fields, which is listed under annex 1 of the draft oil law (which lists those fields that may only be developed by the Iraqi National Oil Company [INOC]). The KRG had asked that Khurmala be moved to annex 3 (which lists fields that may be contracted to the IOCs, permitting PSCs) in order for it to be given to the private companies at a later date. (See Letter of Iraqi oil professionals of September 26, 2007.) This follows a signed agreement by the Oil Ministry in Baghdad with a Turkish company two years ago which was about to start construction activities, but were blocked from doing so by the KRG.

These factors all led the Oil & Gas parliamentary committee and the minister of oil, Dr. Shahristani, to declare on several occasions that the federal Oil Ministry considers all these agreements as illegal and they have threatened to take legal action against these companies, as well as putting them on a blacklist, depriving them from participation in any future contracts with the Oil Ministry.

As this split widens, the approval of the federal oil law in the Iraqi parliament will be an extremely difficult goal to achieve under such circumstances.

2. The weakness of Al-Maliki’s Government and the sectarian divisions within the parties participating in the political process.

The formation of the "front of the moderates" on August 15, 2007, between the two main Kurdish parties (KDP and the PUK), two of the main Shiite parties -- the SCIRI and Al-Dawa party (the Al-Maliki wing is called the "External organization") -- and the Islamic Party/Accord front (the main Sunni party), did not succeed in delivering the new oil law up to this date.

The failure of these parties in approving the oil law and the re-Baathification law was due to the following reasons:

First, the front was no more than a conservative political alliance, formed to pass certain laws with no agreed political agenda or plans among the parties involved.

Second, the disagreements and divisions between the parties were very wide, as each of them was mainly concerned with supporting its own party interests, the interest of the sectarian groups each represents, as well as gaining a larger slice of political power. This was the main reason behind the action of the Accord front in pulling out its ministers from Al-Maliki’s government.

Third, when the parties formed the "front of the moderates" they all agreed to support the oil law in principle. However, when it came down to the details they disagreed on several issues in the oil law.

In addition, several MP’s from Al-Dawa's “Iraq organization” wing and the “Accord front” had never been supporters of the draft oil law.

Fourth, the long standing combined political and sectarian disagreements between the parties involved in the alliance were stronger than all the on-going pressure that have been forced upon them by the US Administration to this date.

These disagreements and the sectarian agendas of the political parties paralyzed the government’s ability to agree on the oil law, so that when the law itself reached parliament their ability to agree on the law was also impaired -- despite the fact that the parties within the "front of the moderates" held the majority in the federal parliament.

Finally, came the deadline for the crises on the Kirkuk Referendum. Under Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, the Iraqi government must complete the normalization process in Kirkuk, hold a census and then a referendum on the status of Kirkuk no later than December 31, 2007. This process has now been delayed by a further six months, which has created more tensions between the parties involved in the political process and has formed another obstacle to agreement on the oil law.

3. Increased Iraqi public awareness and pressure.

This topic was covered in more detail in my August 22 analysis.

However, it is important to emphasize that the activities of Iraqi civil society’s organizations, groups, and individuals against the oil law have been increasing in several parts of Iraq and in particular in Basra and Baghdad.


ZNet |Iraq | The internal struggle for the Iraqi oil law continues

Continued.......

4. The security and economic crisis.

The partial improvements of the security situation in the past few months was more visible in Baghdad, its surrounding areas and the western provinces. However, this is most likely no more than temporary progress, as these improvements are founded mainly on security measures and few political consensuses. Therefore, only a small percentage of the millions of displaced civilians were able to return to their homes.

On the other hand, there was an increase in the number of military attacks by occupying forces against civilian targets in the south/centre provinces of Al Diwaniya, Al Kute and Karbala, as well as in the activities of the CIA-controlled death squads in the southern provinces of Al Amarah and Basrah.

The recent escalation of tension between the Turkish government and the KRG, and the military attacks of the Turkish army and air force in the Kurdish provinces, with the consent and help of the US administration, have widened the areas where military actions are taking places in Iraq. This is a new area of conflict, which has resulted in reaching parts of Iraq which have had no or very few military attacks and civilian casualties during the previous four years.

As for the economic situation, it remains unchanged. There have been no improvements in the job market, with millions still unemployed and most Iraqi cities and towns still having either no or severe shortages of electricity, clean water and other basic life necessities.

So, Iraqis are still continuing to question the wisdom of trying to concentrate on rushing the Oil & Gas law through parliament while the country continues to be in such a devastated state.

Conclusions:

In addition to the conclusions in my August 22 article which still stand in principle, the following new conclusions have surfaced since then, and are highlighted below:

1. The US Administration and the IOCs have recognized in the past few months that their tactics up until the middle of 2007 of ‘publicly’ imposing all kinds of benchmarks and deadlines on the Iraqi government are having the opposite effect on their chances of having the oil law passed by the Iraqi parliament.

2. It has become clear that it’s in the interest of the US & the IOCs to use more discreet methods of pressure in order to improve their chances of having the oil law materialize.

This change in tactics is due to the increase in opposition and mistrust by the vast majority of the Iraqi people from all classes. This rejection is not only towards the oil law, but also towards all US administration policies that attempt to continue the occupation under different forms.

These tactical changes should not be seen as an indication of any strategic changes in the US attitude toward the oil law. The US administration, the Democrats, and the strong international oil lobbies are all adamant that passing this oil law is a vitally important benchmark, and that this goal should be pursued, whatever the cost to the Iraqi people.

3. Some Iraqi and international oil experts and analysts believe that the US Administration and the big oil giants were behind the pressured rush in passing the Kurdish oil law in August 2007 without waiting for the outcome of the federal oil law. They also believe that the twenty PSC agreements which were signed between the KRG and IOCs were further part of the discreet pressure applied on the federal parliament to pass the federal oil law. This pressure seems to have been yet another mistaken policy, which has misfired and resulted in widening the split between the oil ministry in Baghdad and the KRG, and has ultimately caused even more delay to the federal oil law.

4. Several Iraqi civil society organisations and groups including the group of the “sixty Iraqi oil professionals” (see their Sept. 26, 2007, letter), the IFOU "Iraqi Federation of the Oil Union” and individual Iraqi oil experts have issued statements supporting the stance of the oil minister and the parliamentary committee in rejecting the steps which were taken by the KRG. Such support should be looked upon as no more than tactical support to this particular stance of the Iraqi oil minister, but not towards his strategy on the oil law.

5. It is becoming more and more apparent that the US Administration and the big IOCs are using the KRG’s self interest, as a main tool in their plan to pass the federal oil law.

6. It is interesting to note that none of the big IOCs have signed any PSC agreements with the KRG and that they have left these PSCs to the smaller companies. This clearly indicates that the big IOCs are relying mainly on the federal oil law for their big contracts.

On the other hand we see that the big IOCs are carrying out all types of ‘behind closed doors’ negotiations with the oil ministry in Baghdad to prepare the ground for quick deals as soon as the federal oil law materializes (see Ben Lando, United Press International, "Analysis: Big oil to sign Iraq deals soon," December 6, 2007).

7. Other methods used recently by the big IOCs include negotiations to share among themselves some of the already-signed PSCs with the old Baath regime. It was reported that US giant Chevron and France’s Total have agreed to jointly develop “The Majnoon oil field,” one of the largest oil fields in southern Iraq. (Dow Jones news service report, August 8, 2007.) But this giant field is listed as number 16 in annex 1 of the draft oil law (versions of February and June 2007), which is the list of fields that can only be developed by the INOC. This indicates that the Iraqi Government/Oil Ministry have secretly agreed with some IOCs to deceive the Iraqi Parliament, and to give the IOCs some of the oil fields that the new law prohibits from being developed by anyone other than INOC. The Majnoon oil field was the main field which the Iraqi Baathist government wanted to give to Total under a PSC agreement during their secret negotiations in the 1990s, and over which Total reached a tentative agreement with the Baathist government in 2000. The negotiations did not end with any official open agreement because of the UN sanctions at the time (Oil Companies in Iraq: A Century of Rivalry and War).

8. No action has been taken by the federal government to reinstate INOC. To this date, the Iraqi government has not attempted to introduce a law to reinstate INOC, which was dissolved by the Baath government back in 1987. This is clearly a deliberate attempt by the ministry of oil to give the IOCs the upper hand to push for PSC modules, since without reinstating INOC first, which gives the oil ministry the backup option of developing future oil production on its own, the negotiating position of the ministry will remain very weak,.

9. The Iraqi oil minister and the technocrats in the oil ministry, who, together with their foreign advisers, are behind the rush for the approval of the draft oil law, are becoming very frustrated with the inability of the government and the “front of the moderates” to get the oil law approved by the parliament. This has led them to start secret negotiations, some of which have taken place between Dr. Shahristani and representatives of BP, Shell, and other big IOCs at the beginning of December during the OPEC meetings in Abu Dhabi. (Lando, "Analysis: Big oil to sign Iraq deals soon.")

10. It is significant to note, that the entire vigorous political struggle in opposition to the new oil law has been carried out within the framework of the existing Iraqi political process. This emphasizes that with all the negative features of this process, there are no alternative options to use. Recent Iraqi political history indicates that the oil law would have been passed some time ago, in a similar fashion to the privatization laws of the Baath regime between 1987 and 2002, if the Occupation's Governing Council and its appointed puppet, Allawi's Government were still in power.

11. There is an increase in the positive and effective campaigning taking place around the world against the oil law by international organisations. Some of these organisations have been formed from existing groups, especially to oppose the oil law including the UK “Hands off Iraqi oil”, the US “Stop the Iraqi oil law”, and others. Environmental groups, anti-occupational movements and several international trade unions are providing vital support to the Iraqi anti-oil law movements, and they are carrying out very constructive and helpful media campaigns. (UK Organizations: PLATFORM and War on Want; US Organizations: Global Policy Forum, Institute for Policy Studies, and Oil Change International.)

12. The most important struggle facing the opponents of the federal oil law is still ahead.

We all have to remember that the most significant motive behind the US/UK war and the follow up occupation of Iraq was to ensure their full control over Iraqi oil reserves. So neither the US/UK Administrations nor the big IOCs or their friends are going to easily give up the fight simply because of the internal Iraqi factors which delay the new oil law.

They will intensify their pressure on all Iraqi parties, especially their allies in the "front of the moderates". They will change tactics and use all types of tricks. They will pay whatever it takes and will give all types of promises, in order to pass the oil law in one form or another through the Iraqi parliament. They need this law for their future domination and control.

The year 2008 will be a vital one for all Iraqi and international opponents of the oil law.

If the US Administration and the IOC succeed in their assault to privatize nationalized Iraqi oil, then this will be their first step before they move to impose these types of privatization laws on other Gulf countries and states, where over 75% of the world’s proven oil reserves are located.


Munir Chalabi is an Iraqi political and oil analyst living in the UK

ZNet |Iraq | The internal struggle for the Iraqi oil law continues

Al-Hashimi and Barham Salih Visits Al-Maliki

Yesterday Dr. Tariq al Hashimi, Iraqi Vice President and Dr. Barham Salih, Deputy of Iraqi PM, paid a visit to Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in his residence in Baghdad after his return from London, where he made “routine” medical tests due to suffering from tiredness.

PUKmedia :: English - Al-Hashimi and Barham Salih Visits Al-Maliki

Barham Salih: Security Improvement paves Way to start Reconstruction Process

Yesterday the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Barham Salih, received a delegation from U.S Congress in Baghdad.

During the meeting which was attended by a number of the Iraqi and American officials, the deputy prime minister asserted the necessity of achieving better security progress so as to start the reconstruction and rehabilitation process.

In this regard, several decisions were issued by the Iraqi government to provide a healthy and suitable circumstance to restart development and economic process as he further added.

Later he referred to the vital role of the Iraqi forces and Awakening council’s forces in cooperation with multinational forces in achieving better security situation in different areas of Iraq.

PUKmedia :: English - Barham Salih: Security Improvement paves Way to start Reconstruction Process

Iraqna, MTC Atheer merge into Zain

Iraq's two successful mobile telephone network operators MTC Atheer and Iraqna have merged into Zain In Iraq to serve nearly 7.5 millions customers all over the country.

"Today marks the launch of Zain In Iraq, which includes two of the most influential telecommunications companies in new Iraq: Iraqna and MTC Atheer," the general and executive director of the newly merged company, Ali al-Dahouy, told the independent news agency Voices of Iraq (VOI).

"Zain In Iraq has thus become the second largest company in Zain group, which operates in 22 countries in the Middle East and Africa," al-Dahouy said during a Baghdad-based press conference, explaining that there are 7.5 million subscribers to the company, compared to 11 million in Nigeria.

"The merge has established the most powerful mobile telephone operator in Iraq and the Middle East. It gives a drive to the Iraqi economy," the director noted.

"The group looks forward to establishing a single network covering all Arab countries, a project which is scheduled to finish by this summer," according to al-Dahouy.

Zain Group said in a statement that its area of operation include several countries in the Middle East: Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain and Sudan as Zain; in Iraq as MTC Atheer; in Lebanon as MTC Touch; and in 14 sub-Saharan countries in Africa as Celtel.

AsiaCell, Korek Telecom and MTC Atheer were the three winners in the mobile phone license auction held by the Iraqi government in the Jordanian capital Amman in August 2007.

Mobile phone services were first launched in Iraq in early 2004 following the collapse of the former Iraqi regime and the Cairo-based Orascom Telecom Holdings, Kuwait's Mobile Telecommunications Co and AsiaCell were the winners in an auction that drew 35 bidders. Under the then contracts, Orascom's network covered central Iraq, including Baghdad, AsiaCell served northern Iraq, while Atheer Tel (from Kuwait) operated in the south.

There are eight million mobile subscribers in Iraq which has 26 million inhabitants.

The fixed phone lines network was damaged because of sanctions imposed on the country after the invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
Less than 4 percent of the Iraqi people have fixed phone lines.

Aswat Aliraq

Awakening council leaders say PM's statements on infiltration odd

Leaders of Baghdad's awakening councils expressed their surprise at the Iraqi prime minister's recent statements about Baathist elements and al-Qaeda insurgents infiltrating their councils.

"The government fears the infiltration of awakening councils by members of the dissolved Baath Party, which, at one time, was the only party in Iraq and represented 95% of the population," the international al-Hayat newspaper quoted the leader of the military wing of al-Taaji Awakening Council, Saeed Aziz Salman, as saying.

"Most of our council members, totaling 520 fighters, belong to the Baath Party," Salman indicated, adding, "It has now become clear why the Ministry of Interior had refused to merge awakening council members into it."

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said during an interview published on Saturday by the international al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper that his government supports the tribal councils and their role in restoring order to many Iraqi provinces, voicing his fears about the infiltration of these councils by outside elements.

According to the leader of Fursan al-Rafideen Awakening Council, Saad al-Oreibi, only 20% of the councils' fighters will be merged into the Iraqi ministries of defense and interior, including 100 elements from Fursan al-Rafideen council.

"The government questions the patriotism of council members and provides unconvincing pretexts for its refusal to merge them into the ministries. It has officially stated that the councils are penetrated by Baathist elements and al-Qaeda organization, which is not true because we have demonstrated our keenness to purge our areas of al-Qaeda and other armed groups," al-Oreibi indicated.

"The government's failure to integrate council members into its security and military institutions will prompt us to keep our agreements with the U.S. forces," he added.

Several awakening councils have been set up in a number of Iraqi provinces, including Anbar, Diala, Ninewa and Salah al-Din, with the aim of building a pan-tribal alliance against al-Qaeda. The councils are usually chaired by tribal leaders who have forged an alliance with the Iraqi security apparatus and U.S. forces.

Aswat Aliraq

Arab League delegation visits Iraq to activate reconciliation

A high-level delegation from the Arab League will arrive in Iraq in the next few days to activate the national reconciliation project, a member of the Iraqi parliament said.

"A delegation under ambassador Ahmed Bin Helli, the Assistant Secretary General of the Arab League, will arrive in Iraq for talks with all parties in order to bolster dialogue and national reconciliation and push forward the political process," Faleh al-Fayyad, the chairman of the Iraqi parliament's higher committee on national dialogue, told the independent news agency Voices of Iraq (VOI) by telephone.

On whether the dialogue would encompass the Baathists, Fayyad, who is currently in Cairo, the venue of the pan-Arab organization, replied that the dialogue would "encompass all parties."

Fayyad denied convening any conferences on reconciliation at present.
"Reports that a new conference on reconciliation would be held in Cairo were groundless. No place or time were set for a reconciliation conference in the foreseeable future," Fayyad said.

He said, "We called on the Arab League, during our meeting with Secretary General Amr Moussa, to have a balanced role with all parties," adding "the League has an important role to play in improving conditions in Iraq thanks to its good ties with all Iraqi parties."

On the League's role in cementing Iraqi-Arab relations, Fayyad said "the secretary general has promised to interfere with Arab countries to help Iraq and re-establish diplomatic representation in Baghdad."

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had offered his proposal on national reconciliation before the Iraqi parliament in June 2006. The proposal was welcomed and supported by all parliamentary blocs despite some reservations on a number of items.

Maliki said his proposal did not "include murderers and those who were involved in acts of sabotage."

Aswat Aliraq

Accountability & Justice Law to be voted on Monday – MP

The Iraqi parliament's debaathification committee finalized amendments to the accountability & justice law, which replaces the law on debaathification, to be cast to vote on Monday, a legislator who chairs the committee said on Sunday.

"Objections were expressed by the deputies during the 2nd reading of the accountability & justice draft. The debaathification committee studies these objections and amended the draft in a meeting that comprised all members of the committee," Falah Shanshal told the independent news agency Voices of Iraq (VOI).

On the position of the Sadrist bloc, or Iraqis loyal to Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, as regards these amendments, Shanshal replied that the Sadrist bloc views that the name "debaathification" should preferably remains as it is based on article 135 of the constitution.

The debaathification law lays several restrictions on members of the outlawed Baath Party and prevents about 30,000 of them to return to their state positions or get their retirement rights.

The draft, since it was first announced by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in June 2006, has been met with numerous objections and reservations, mostly from the Sadrist bloc.

If passed, the accountability & justice law would offer thousands of members of the former Baath (Awakening) Party, which is now banned in Iraq, to return to their jobs and receive retirement dues.

Aswat Aliraq

Parliament to vote on 2008 budget law on Monday- MP

The Iraqi parliament will vote on the 2008 budget law during its session on Monday, an independent member of parliament said on Sunday.

"The parliament is determined to discuss and approve several crucial laws in the coming few days, including the accountability and justice law and the 2008 budget law, especially after Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh and Minister of Finance al-Zubeidi had provided a thorough budget review," MP Safiya al-Suheil told the independent news agency Voices of Iraq (VOI).

"Other laws will be voted on during Monday's session," al-Suheil indicated, linking the absence of the quorum in previous parliamentary sessions to official holidays and dismissing political disputes as the reason behind the lack of the quorum.

Aswat Aliraq