Thread: Operation Iraqi Freedom/Multi-National Force

3-1 Cav. finds four weapons caches, detains five


Saturday, 07 July 2007
Multi-National Corps – Iraq
Public Affairs Office, Camp Victory
APO AE 09342

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
RELEASE No. 20070707-06
July 7, 2007

3-1 Cav. finds four weapons caches, detains five
Multi-National Division – Center PAO


FORWARD OPERATING BASE HAMMER, Iraq — Soldiers of 3rd Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, and Company D, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, detained five suspected insurgents and found four weapons caches July 5 near Jisr Diyala.

The operation resulted in the largest cache seizure for the 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team since beginning operations southeast of Baghdad in late March.
Unit leaders said Soldiers conducted the five-phase operation to deny enemy sanctuaries and seize caches. Soldiers from 3-1 Cav. and Company D, currently attached to 3-1 Cav., secured and searched four target locations simultaneously during the operation.

Each cache found and destroyed decreases the munitions and improvised explosive device making materials available for insurgents to use against the populace and Coalition Forces, said Capt. Jimmy Hathaway, from Columbus, Ga., commander of Headquarters Co., 3-1 Cav.

“Ultimately, this mission was a step in the right direction towards making Iraq a more secure and safe region,” Hathaway said.

“The mission established the standard that Coalition Forces are not going to stand for anti-Coalition Force activity,” said 1ST Lt. Donovan Duke, from New Cumberland, Pa., a platoon leader with Company D, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, from Fort Benning, Ga. “We are here to establish a safe environment in cooperation with the Iraqi Security Forces for the Iraqi citizens.”

The following was seized from the four caches: 8 fuses, four artillery rounds, three rockets, nine hand grenades, 56 mortars, 10 rocket propelled grenades, more than 15 pounds of C4 explosives and miscellaneous bomb-making materials and unidentified explosives.

The 3-1 Cav. is assigned to the 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, from Fort Benning, Ga.


Multi-National Force - Iraq - 3-1 Cav. finds four weapons caches, detains five

EOD blow up insurgents’ plans


Saturday, 07 July 2007

By Spc. Ben Hutto
4th Infantry Division Public Affairs

Sgt. 1st Class Ed Allbaugh, 35, of Newark, Ohio, and a platoon sergeant for the 789th Explosive Ordnance Company, cradles the phone between his shoulder and cheek, grabs a pen and paper and goes to work.

“Ok, what was that grid coordinate?” he asks.

As he gets the details of an Improvised Explosive Device explosion in the 3rd Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment’s area of operation, Sgt. 1st Class Choate Smith, 37, Houston, walks into the room and listens.

Both non-commissioned officers are all ready formulating a plan before the phone call is finished.

When Allbaugh hangs up, they quickly coordinate.

“This one mine?” asks Allbaugh.

“Yeah, take the two that got back last night and go,” says Smith.

As Allbaugh gears up and walks out the door, Smith smiles.

“Just another day,” he says with a shrug.

The 789th Explosive Ordnance has been at Forward Operating Base Hammer for two months, but they have already been involved in 95 incidents involving explosives. They have destroyed or neutralized improvised explosive devices, unexploded ordnance, enemy caches, remnants of war and munitions.

“We’ve averaged about one or two incidents a day,” says Smith. “I normally wake up, go to the brigade and check intelligence. After that, we are on the go trying to stop the bad guys.”

Capt. Justin Gerken, 33, from Red Wing, Minn., the commander of the 789th, is thankful for the Soldiers he has.

“These guys are, by far, the most intelligent people in the Army, in my opinion,” he said.

“They have to have a 110 GT score just to get in this MOS. After that, their training has a 60 percent attrition rate. We like to think we have the best minds in the Army. They never deal with the same situation twice. They are very adaptable and think on their feet well. These guys also have a high level of maturity and responsibility. We have staff sergeants rolling up on a site and they have on-scene command.”

The group’s experience is a big asset in handling the stressful scenarios they come across.

“Just between the senior leadership, we have over 60 years combined experience,” explained Allbaugh. “We’ve taught most of the guys under us at AIT. We are in a small field. We all know one another in some way. I might not know a person, but I probably know someone they work with. It helps that we are so small. Everyone does their job and looks out for one another. It definitely builds a bond within this unit.”

As various Soldiers run in and out of the EOD office getting ready to go out, Gerken takes a moment to reflect about what makes his group special.

“It is really an honor to command a group of Soldiers like this,” he said. “These Soldiers volunteered to go out to live IED sites and help prevent them from hurting people. It sounds cool that they get to play with explosives, but really they are about saving people’s lives.”

Smith, who has been neutralizing explosives for the last 11 years, understands how important his job is.

“If we make a mistake, we can damage property, equipment, the local infrastructure and, most importantly lives.”

Smith also offers any advice to Soldiers who happen to be at an IED site when he is working.

“If you see me running, you better catch up,” he says with a smile.


Multi-National Force - Iraq - EOD blow up insurgents’ plans

Originally Posted by lewscrew

Apache crews kill insurgents after attack on base

The Apache crew engaged the vehicle, destroying it and killing the insurgents inside.

Multi-National Force - Iraq - Apache crews kill insurgents after attack on base

Get some Apaches!!
HOOAH!!

An article by Michael Yon


Baqubah Update: 05 July 2007

Today marks “D +16” of Operation “Arrowhead Ripper,” the Battle for Baqubah. Arrowhead Ripper kicked off on 19 June 07. I have several dispatches in the works about the major events since that time. Although the serious fighting seems to be over, there remains a possibility for some sharp fighting in the near future. The morning of 06 July began with the sounds of American cannons firing, shells whizzing through the air, while they checked systems and aiming for combat. Apache helicopters orbited Baqubah as the orange sun crested into view.

Media coverage went from a near monopoly (Michael Gordon from New York Times and me) to a nearly capsized boat as journalists flooded in from other parts of Iraq to see the fight. They managed to miss most of it. Today, I’m told, there are now only 3 journalists remaining, including one writer (me).

As with the Battle for Mosul, which I held in near monopoly for about five months during 2005, the most interesting parts of the Battle for Baqubah are unfolding after the major fighting ends. But as the guns cool, the media stops raining and starts evaporating, or begins making only short visits of a week or so.

The big news on the streets today is that the people of Baqubah are generally ecstatic, although many hold in reserve a serious concern that we will abandon them again. For many Iraqis, we have morphed from being invaders to occupiers to members of a tribe. I call it the “al Ameriki tribe,” or “tribe America.”

I’ve seen this kind of progression in Mosul, out in Anbar and other places, and when I ask our military leaders if they have sensed any shift, many have said, yes, they too sense that Iraqis view us differently. In the context of sectarian and tribal strife, we are the tribe that people can—more or less and with giant caveats—rely on.

Most Iraqis I talk with acknowledge that if it was ever about the oil, it’s not now. Not mostly anyway. It clearly would have been cheaper just to buy the oil or invade somewhere easier that has more. Similarly, most Iraqis seem now to realize that we really don’t want to stay here, and that many of us can’t wait to get back home. They realize that we are not resolved to stay, but are impatient to drive down to Kuwait and sail away. And when they consider the Americans who actually deal with Iraqis every day, the Iraqis can no longer deny that we really do want them to succeed. But we want them to succeed without us. We want to see their streets are clean and safe, their grass is green, and their birds are singing. We want to see that on television. Not in person. We don’t want to be here. We tell them that every day. It finally has settled in that we are telling the truth.

Now that all those realizations and more have settled in, the dynamics here are changing in palpable ways.

Since my reporting of the massacre at the al Hamari village, many readers at home have asked how anyone can know that al Qaeda actually performed the massacre. The question is a very good one, and one that I posed from the first hour to Iraqis and Americans while trying to ascertain facts about the killings.

No one can claim with certainty that it was al Qaeda, but the Iraqis here seem convinced of it. At a meeting today in Baqubah one Iraqi official I spoke with framed the al Qaeda infiltration and influence in the province. Although he spoke freely before a group of Iraqi and American commanders, including Staff Major General Abdul Kareem al Robai who commands Iraqi forces in Diyala, and LTC Fred Johnson, the deputy commander of 3-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, the Iraqi official asked that I withhold his identity from publication. His opinion, shared by others present, is that al Qaeda came to Baqubah and united many of the otherwise independent criminal gangs.

Speaking through an American interpreter, Lieutenant David Wallach who is a native Arabic speaker, the Iraqi official related how al Qaeda united these gangs who then became absorbed into “al Qaeda.” They recruited boys born during the years 1991, 92 and 93 who were each given weapons, including pistols, a bicycle and a phone (with phone cards paid) and a salary of $100 per month, all courtesy of al Qaeda. These boys were used for kidnapping, torturing and murdering people.

At first, he said, they would only target Shia, but over time the new al Qaeda directed attacks against Sunni, and then anyone who thought differently. The official reported that on a couple of occasions in Baqubah, al Qaeda invited to lunch families they wanted to convert to their way of thinking. In each instance, the family had a boy, he said, who was about 11 years old. As LT David Wallach interpreted the man’s words, I saw Wallach go blank and silent. He stopped interpreting for a moment. I asked Wallach, “What did he say?” Wallach said that at these luncheons, the families were sat down to eat. And then their boy was brought in with his mouth stuffed. The boy had been baked. Al Qaeda served the boy to his family.

The Deputy Governor for Diyala Province had told me on 04 July that al Qaeda burned the home of a Provincial Council leader named Abdul Jabar. Jabar, an Iraqi official who has no reservations about being named as a source, provided information about the killings I described in the dispatch “Bless the Beasts and Children.” Abdul Jabar lived in the area of the al Hamira village, which he said is properly spelled al Ahamir. Jabar agreed to a video interview, during which he said al Qaeda killed and disposed of hundreds of people in the area. He also said during the video interview that he did not believe the remains of the murder victims I saw were people from the village. Abdul Jabar believes the villagers were run out, and that the people being dug up were kidnapped from elsewhere.
Diyala Provincial chair holder Adbul Jabar [All photos shot on 05 Jul 07 in Baqubah]

Like many things in Iraq, the question of whether or not the murderers were al Qaeda is flawed from beginning. Al Qaeda is not a union, it doesn’t issue passports. What is al Qaeda but the collection of people who claim to be al Qaeda? Those responsible for murdering and burying those bodies in al Ahamir (or al Hamira) had the markers of al Qaeda, the same al Qaeda that had boastfully installed itself as the shadow government of Baqubah. The al Qaeda who committed atrocities in Afghanistan, New York . . . the list is long. As for al Ahamir, the massacre “walks like a duck.” It happened in duck headquarters. The people here say the duck did it. The duck laughs.

And so on 05 July, or D + 16, after the meeting, Iraqi leaders including the Deputy Governor of Diyala, and also Abdul Jabar, one of the Provincial chair holders, headed to some of the most dangerous areas in Baqubah on what Americans would call “a meet and greet.” At first the people seemed hesitant, but when they saw Iraqi leaders—along with members of their own press—asking citizens what they needed, each place we stopped grew into a festival of smiles.

The people were jubilant. None of the kids—and by the end of the day there were hundreds—asked me for anything, other than to take their photos. These were not the kids-made-brats by well-meaning soldiers, but polite Iraqi kids in situ, and the cameras were like a roller coaster ride for them. The kids didn’t care much for the video; they wanted still photos taken. While the kids were trying to get me to photograph them, it was as if the roller coaster was cranking and popping up the tracks, but when I finally turned the camera on them—snap!—it was as if the roller coaster had crested the apex and slipped into the thrill of gravity. Of course, once the ride ended, it only made some clamor for more. Iraqi kids that have not been spoiled by handouts are the funniest I have seen anywhere.


This boy wanted his photo taken over and over.

American soldiers just watched, but during one of the impromptu stops, an Iraqi man who might have been 30 years old came up and said that he’d been beaten up by soldiers from the 5th Iraqi Army. He had the marks on his face to lend initial credence. But most striking was that he hadn’t gone to the Iraqi leaders, nor did he come to the man with the camera and note pad. He did what I see Iraqis increasingly doing: he went to the local sheik of “al Ameriki tribe.” In this case, the sheik was LTC Fred Johnson. (Note: I have not heard anyone calling the American commanders sheiks, but during meetings around Iraq, American officers often preside like sheiks and with sheiks.)

More and more Iraqis put their trust in Americans as arbiters of justice. The man said he was afraid to complain to Iraqi officials because he might get killed, but he wanted to tell LTC Johnson, who listened carefully. When the man pleaded for anonymity, Johnson said he needed written statements from witnesses. The man pointed to some witnesses, and then disappeared and came back with statements, and I can say from my own eyes that Johnson was careful with those statements, guarding them until he could get alone with an Iraqi general later on 05 July.


These kids crack me up. But you do have to be careful: every once in a while they throw a hand grenade or detonate an IED. The enemy uses them like fodder.


Iraqi fathers constantly dive toward the camera: Got to show those kids off. They’ll walk all the way across the road just to get a photo of their baby taken.


Abdul Jabar (center) and the Deputy Governor of Diyala (right).

On D +1 and for those first few days of Operation Arrowhead Ripper, the Iraqi leaders seemed mostly inert. But now on D+16, only about two weeks later, they are out politicking, showing their faces in public, letting the people know they are in charge. And, unlike the tired cliché of a politician in a parade, they truly have been working behind the scenes. I know because I sit in on the meetings, and listen to the progress reports as items on the lists get checked off. I hear the whining as each section of Baqubah seems to think they are the forgotten ones. “Why the Sunni getting help first?” they ask. But then in another neighborhood, “Why the Shia getting help first?” But I watch the sausage-making. LTC Johnson will say, “Mike, c’mon. It’s time to make sausage and you need to see this.” It’s messy and frustrating. But food shipments have resumed to Baqubah after 10 months of nothing. Not that Diyala Province is starving: Diyala is, after all, Iraq’s breadbasket.


Iraqi girls are like Iraqi fathers: they come up to the camera with the babies, but every-once-in-a-baby, the baby wants to be somewhere else.


Michael Yon : Online Magazine » Blog Archive » Baqubah Update: 05 July 2007

Lewscrew, thanks so much for the effort you put into this thread.

It is so refreshing to read good news about our progress and help build confidence in all the work that is being done over there. Kudos!!!

Originally Posted by 40plus

Lewscrew, thanks so much for the effort you put into this thread.

It is so refreshing to read good news about our progress and help build confidence in all the work that is being done over there. Kudos!!!

It is my pleasure 40plus, they are definatly making excellent progress! Thanks for the post! lewscrew

Village residents lead troops to caches

Sunday, 08 July 2007


Soldiers from Company C,4th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division were led to a series of 12 weapons caches July 6 by a local informant in Qarghuli Village, Iraq, near the site of the May 12 attack. The caches contained mortars, rockets and improvised explosive device-making materials. U.S. Army photo by 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division Public Affairs.

BAGHDAD — Residents of a village south of Baghdad, long a terrorist hot spot, led U.S. forces to major weapons caches near their town July 6.
Local villagers from Qarghuli took Soldiers of 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), out of Fort Drum, N.Y., to a series of 12 caches – and the insurgents responsible for them.

A local man who claimed to have knowledge of a large cache complex approached the patrol and walked the Soldiers from site to site, pointing out each cache. He then took the patrol to two men, whom he said were responsible for collecting and hiding the weapons.

One cache contained a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launching kit still its original box; six fuses for 82mm mortars, an 82mm round prepared as an improvised explosive device, two re-sealable plastic bags containing maps, books, a guard roster, a set of ballistic eyeglasses, two bags of homemade explosives (HME), a rocket launcher with two tubes, a rocket engine, a videotape and photos.

Another contained nine 60mm mortar rounds with 11 fuses, about 55 blasting caps, a block of HME, seven empty 60mm mortar shells, an RPG fuse, 18 feet of detonation cord, a ten-pound bag of black powder, and 28 rocket tips.

Another contained nine 120mm mortar rounds, two AK-47 rifles, two 105mm rounds, 20 pounds of HME, 20 AK-47 magazines, and several mortar fuses.

Another held 61 60mm rounds, five 120mm rounds and seven charges for the 120mm rounds.

An extensive cache contained a 107mm rocket, five hand grenades, a video camera, a 105mm round rigged as an IED, three grenade fuses, a front plate to a radio, two handheld walkie-talkies, 66 sticks of dynamite, 20 pounds of black powder, 20 blasting caps and 20 pounds of HME, 20 feet of detonation cord, a pressure plate for an IED, a sniper instruction CD, a long-range cordless telephone and a homemade boat with two paddles.

Another contained 43 mortar fuses, two AK-47 magazines, 18 load-bearing vests, a cellular telephone and battery, and 10 mortar primers.

Explosive ordnance disposal teams destroyed the explosives and several other items were seized for further examination.

The area where the caches were found is approximately one kilometer from the site of the May 12 attack where four U.S. Soldiers and an Iraqi soldier were killed and three U.S. Soldiers were captured. One of the Soldiers was later found dead in the Euphrates River, the remaining two are officially listed as “missing-captured.”

Residents, fed up with the violence plaguing their neighborhood, have repeatedly revealed al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists in the area to patrolling Soldiers.

Two Iraqis associated with the caches were detained by the Soldiers and taken into custody for questioning.

(U.S. Army story by 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division Public Affairs)

Multi-National Force - Iraq - Village residents lead troops to caches

Wolverines’ ready for anything on mission for Iraqi children

Sunday, 08 July 2007
By 1st Lt. Daniel Sem
209th Aviation Support Battalion


U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Frederick Williams, the patrol leader for the May 23 humanitarian operation, speaks with two Iraqi children outside the village school while his soldiers secure the perimeter of the schoolyard. U.S. Army photo.

TIKRIT — The mission briefing ends as the morning cool gives way to the 100-degree noon heat. Soldiers don their body armor. Truck commanders quickly do a final inspection on their vehicles. Gunners check and re-check their turret-mounted 240B machine guns. A driver catches a last-minute smoke break while the theme to “Mission Impossible” plays in the background over a vehicle loudspeaker.

They are minutes away from heading outside the wire into the dangerous, unpredictable Iraqi landscape.

The mission they are entrusted with today, May 23, 2007, is the escort of supplies on a joint-humanitarian mission with the Iraqi police to benefit a local school. It would be just a normal day for any infantry soldier, but these are not infantry soldiers. They are the motor pool mechanics, communication spe******ts, truck drivers and aircraft maintenance personnel of the 209th Aviation Support Battalion serving their tour in Iraq on the Contingency Operating Base Speicher Quick Reaction Force.

“Essentially, we react to any contingency that may occur on or off post involving enemy forces,” Master Sgt. Frank Wallace, the 209th ASB QRF noncommissioned officer in charge, said. “The heart of the QRF mission is to be trained and ready for anything.”

With two teams on 12-hour shifts, ready to react to any manner of threat at any hour of the day, the 209th ASB QRF, known as the Wolverines, vigilantly guard the security of thousands of soldiers living safely inside the wire on COB Speicher. They have been fulfilling this crucial duty since January, and will continue to protect the base until leaving for Hawaii. They are more than security guards, however; the Wolverines also set up traffic control points on local roads, provide convoy security, stake out suspected improvised explosive device ambush sites and go out on humanitarian assistance missions with local Iraqi forces, Wallace said.

“My favorite [mission] is humanitarian assistance,” Wallace said. “Because the soldiers get out, meet the people, find out what’s going on, and see if we can help.”

The complexity and potential risk of the QRF mission might seem like it would bring anxiety and fear to these soldiers, but not the Wolverines.

“I was actually quite excited [about QRF duty],” Staff Sgt. Edward Seerdy, a communications spe******t from Company C and a truck commander in the Wolverines, said. “It was a change in the monotony of things.”

Seerdy’s wife was a little less excited than he was when he told her about the QRF duty.

“She’s not happy, but she understands it’s my job,” Seerdy said, and then clarified his statement after a moment in thought. “Not that she’s not happy; she’s proud of what we do.”

De****e the unknown dangers that await them on every mission, Seerdy said they usually have no complications. “Nothing has really been a surprise,” he said. “Hopefully nothing will surprise us.”

There’s no risk that the missions will become monotonous for him, however.

“You always get an adrenalin rush going outside the wire,” Seerdy said. “I can be asleep until we get to the test fire pit, but as soon as I hear that magazine go into the well [of the machine gun], I’m awake.”

Staff Sgt. Fredrick Williams, a generator mechanic from Headquarters Support Company and the team leader for one of the two Wolverine teams, said the QRF mission appealed to him.

“I was excited,” he said. “I volunteered [to be on the QRF].”

Williams said he is looking forward to more missions with the Wolverines, and is continually impressed with the quality of the QRF team.

“We have a really good group of people,” He said. “It makes my job easier.”

Spc. Andrew McGuffey, a driver for Seerdy’s patrol vehicle, agreed that the team worked very well together and had good leadership. He said the team was not without the occasional difficulty to work through, however.

“There are a few spurs every now and then,” McGuffey said. “A lot of time we’re able to nip those before it becomes a problem.” He said the QRF mission was not exactly what he expected.

“I figured we’d be doing more patrols,” McGuffey said. “(Instead) we’re trying to establish rapport, not go kicking down doors.”

Today’s mission was another trust-building, joint-humanitarian mission with the Iraqi police in a village just beyond the wire of COB Speicher. The team slowly maneuvered through the broad lanes of the Iraqi village, swerving to avoid the endemic low-hanging wires and continually waving the curious Iraqi children out of the streets.

“All these kids look so old,” one of the soldiers said, commenting on the weathered appearance of the Iraqi children as they passed by the vehicles in huddled groups, the children occasionally stopping to smile when they saw a camera aimed through the vehicle window.

The Wolverines moved quickly to secure the school perimeter, and escort the Iraqi police into the schoolyard to hand out the books, school supplies and toys provided by the chaplain, Capt. Bill Kim, 25th Special Troops Battalion, who came along on the mission.

This is Kim’s fourth time out with the Wolverines, and he said they were very quick and professional.

“Couldn’t pick a better (team),” Kim said. This mission proved to be no different. Less than two hours after departing the gates of COB Speicher, the Wolverines finished their escort of the Iraqi police and departed the schoolyard, leaving the much-welcomed school supplies in the hands of grateful Iraqi children.

“It didn’t go too bad,” Seerdy said, cautiously positive about the conclusion of the mission. “Every mission’s a success when you come back with everybody.”

As the team moved back into their staging area to prepare for the next mission, it was no doubt the hope of all the Wolverines that the final efforts of the QRF would be a success by the time they left for Hawaii.

Day by day, mission by mission, the 209th ASB soldiers continue to push forward the cause of the Army in the unpredictable streets of Iraq by guarding the lives of thousands on COB Speicher and leaving their mark on the lives of grateful Iraqi villagers and police.


Multi-National Force - Iraq - ‘Wolverines’ ready for anything on mission for Iraqi children

Ironhorse Brigade, City of Austin team up

Sunday, 08 July 2007
By Multi-National Division – Baghdad Public Affairs Office



U.S. Army Col. Mike Bridges (upper left), Lt. Col. Peter Andrysiak (center), and Maj. Steve Espinoza (right), along with other members of the 1st “Ironhorse” Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, listen intently to advice from Austin, Texas, City Manager Toby Hammett Futrell about Austin’s local government model, during a conference call at Camp Taji, Iraq, June 28. U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Jon Cupp.

CAMP TAJI — In order to help Iraqi local governments move to self-sufficiency, the 1st “Ironhorse” Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division is using expertise from the Austin, Texas, City Manager’s Office to examine concepts of governance from the standpoint of a real, working local government model that may be applied to reconstruction efforts.

In a partnership that began prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom II, the brigade is taking advantage of a program formed by both the 1st Cavalry Division and the 4th Infantry Division to receive feedback and advice on how local governments operate through examples from the City of Austin.

The 1st BCT holds meetings and shares information with officials from the Austin office of City Manager Toby Hammett Futrell, through video teleconferencing and conference calls. According to Lt. Col. Peter Andrysiak, deputy commanding officer, 1st BCT, 1st Cav. Div., having a real local government model for advice and a reach back capability is a boon to the Ironhorse Brigade’s efforts in helping locally-elected Iraqi officials with governance issues.

“They’re showing us great models that can be applied in teaching, coaching and mentoring local Iraqi governments,” said Andrysiak. “It’s good to have professionals that do this every day, to advise us.”

“We’re focusing solely on policy-making and administrative aspects,” he added. “Toby’s team is showing us ideas that work, giving examples which they have used and saying ‘here’s something that we’ve used before and it works.’”

Andrysiak explained that coalition forces are not trying to push Austin’s structure of government onto local Iraqi governments.

“They (the Iraqis) have their own system and we are working within that system with Austin leveraging their experience and processes. There are things inherent in government concepts that just work,” he said, explaining that there are models in place within the realm of civics that are essential to the running of any government. “They can take the models and mold and adapt them to their own culture, and it doesn’t have to be modeled after the American government.”

Although the brigade has many experts from the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development on its Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team, the partnership with Austin helps the brigade to fill in gaps where some of the ePRT experts may not have as much real on the ground experience within the structure of local government as opposed to national government or just dealing with concepts of government.

Col. Mike Bridges, the team leader for the ePRT Governance Team, has experience as a county commissioner for Nome, Alaska, and he welcomes the assistance that Austin is providing though reach back into expertise that is not on the team.

One of the things that has changed since the partnership with Austin began has been a shift in focus when it comes to approaching local governance in Iraq. In the past, said Andrysiak, coalition forces helped the Iraqi governments in setting up city councils which would find out what the needs of the people were.

“The local councils would develop a list of projects without using a formal process, and we would deliver the project for them” he said, citing a health clinic as an example of the types of projects. But according to Andrysiak, once built, because the construction of the clinic was not properly coordinated through the Ministry of Health, it did not have a trained staff or an operating budget.

“We approached a three-dimensional process in a one-dimensional way,” Andrysiak said. Local government is very dynamic with a large number of players, and we weren’t helping the Iraqis leverage all the aspects of local government to make them self sufficient.”

The missing piece of the puzzle was having the leadership team that could administrate the provision of services and the managing of technical staffs to, for example, run something like a local water or solid waste office/department. In essence, the role that a city manager or strong mayor would play in a similar local government in the United States was nearly nonexistent in local governments in Iraq.

Their structure has the positions and their staff requirements defined, but the positions go largely unfulfilled.

“We (the coalition) were acting in roles of the mayor and technical branch of government by delivering products and services to the people, which wasn’t helping the local government become self-reliant,” said Andrysiak.

Now, a new emphasis has been placed, he said, on establishing a local qa’im makam or city manager/mayor who will work with city councils and oversee a technical branch of the government. The qa’im makam serves as an administrator and executor to manage technical services, bringing in technical experts in the fields of medicine, emergency services, water, electricity, waste management and other fields of expertise to deliver services to the people. The qa’im makam would also be in charge of such things as hiring, paying and firing people who work in these local technical departments.

Using a model similar to Austin’s, the 1st BCT will focus on helping local government officials find ways to form committees and subcommittees. These will assist local governments in gaining the self-reliance they need to define their own community goals and objectives which will enable them to provide their own services to their people. The committees and subcommittees would tackle the issues of what kind of goals and objectives the city would want to pursue in an overall vision of their desired end state and use technical branch experts to pursue getting specific projects done, according to Andrysiak.

Also boards, commissions, action groups and task forces made up of Iraqi citizens would be allowed to be part of the political process by having the opportunity to address issues brought up in committees and subcommittees prior to projects going forward and during the process.

Working closely with the people will be an integral part of the local governments achieving success, said Andrysiak.

“As elected officials, they need to get out among the people and bring local citizens into the process,” said Andrysiak. “Under Saddam Hussein the people had no say in anything, so they may be a little hesitant to get involved in government.”

However, the local governments under a city manager or qa’im makam working along with the city councils and technical branches will be much more representative of the people, according to Andrysiak.

“They will see that when you take part in the (government) process, it benefits you the more you participate,” he said, also explaining that Iraqi citizens will essentially be the voice behind their government with the ability to speak their opinions without fear of reprisals — giving them a much larger say in how their government operates.

Andrysiak praised the help that the city of Austin has been giving to the 1st BCT as it in turn, works to help the Iraqi government.

“Austin is a great partner in this effort. They’ve been very gracious in hosting us in this process,” said Andrysiak. “They’re a first-class team doing their part by giving of their own time to help us.”


Multi-National Force - Iraq - Ironhorse Brigade, City of Austin team up

Iraqi Army Forces detain one extremist leader,
four others in operation near Kirkuk


Sunday, 08 July 2007
Multi-National Corps – Iraq
Public Affairs Office, Camp Victory
APO AE 09342


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
RELEASE No. 20070707-16
July 7, 2007

Iraqi Army Forces detain one extremist leader, four others in operation near Kirkuk
Multi-National Corps – Iraq PAO

TAJI – Iraqi Army Forces detained one extremist cell leader and four other suspected terrorists during an operation west of Kirkuk July 5.

The suspected cell leader is believed to be a facilitator for the Islamic Army in Iraq. He is allegedly responsible for obtaining the vehicle used in a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack in Makmoor May 13. The suspected cell leader is also believed to have obtained weapons for the Islamic Army in Iraq to be used in future attacks. Four other suspected terrorists were detained during the operation.

Coalition Forces served as advisors during the operation. No Iraqi or Coalition Forces were injured during the operation.

Multi-National Force - Iraq - Iraqi Army Forces detain one extremist leader, four others in operation near Kirkuk